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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME IX SUMMER, 1955 NUMBER 3
SYMPOSIUM ON LABOR LAW*
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN
RECENT DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARDt
lames R. Websterl
F OR the purposes of this article any decision that has been
rendered during the past year is regarded as "recent," and
those decisions which have given the law on a particular point a
new cloak or complexion or which have opened up a new port-
hole upon the sea of labor relations are regarded as "major."
The topics or points which will be discussed on which there have
been some major and recent decisions of the Board are as follows:
I. Pre-election statements, speeches and conduct of an employer
or union.
II. A union's choice between a representation proceeding and
a refusal to bargain charge.
III. Representation Petitions filed within the certification year.
IV. New consequences of violence during strikes.
These, of course, are not all the major developments within the
past year, but a discussion of too many different topics-too great
a variety of subjects-might lead to confusion.
*The articles comprising this symposium are based upon addresses before the Fifth
Annual Institute on Labor Law presented by the Southwestern Legal Foundation in co-
operation with the S.M.U. School of Law at Dallas, Texas, on March 17 and 18, 1955.
tThis article does not treat the areas covered independently by other articles in
this symposium.




PRE-ELECTION STATEMENTS, SPEECHES AND CONDUCT
We must keep in mind in dealing with this question the three
different consequences of such conduct or statements. It can
result in either (1) grounds for setting aside the election, or (2)
grounds for an unfair labor practice charge, or (3) the conduct
or statements can be neither of these and therefore be permissible.
In reviewing the law, or the evolution of the law, on such
speeches and conduct, it is seen that for many years in the
Board's history, any "colored" statement or any interrogation
constituted an interference within the meaning of section 8 (a) (1)
or rather section 8(1) of the Act. In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act,
or the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, was enacted;
and in it was inserted paragraph 8(c) as a dead-end sign to the
avenue the law was taking on statements and speeches. Section
8(c) provided that, "The expressing of any views, arguments,
or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written,
printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evi-
dence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of
this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit." It is very significant to notice that
this section refers only to grounds for unfair labor practices and
not to grounds for setting aside elections' Then coming up to
'more recent times, in the Peerless Plywood Company case2 and the
Livingston Shirt Company case,8 both of which were decided in
December, 1953, the Board clearly differentiated the consequences
of pre-election speeches. In the Livingston Shirt case, the Board
held that a non-coercive pre-election speech would not constitute
an unfair labor practice, even though equal opportunity to address
the employees on company time and property was denied the
union-in the absence of a broad "no solicitation" rule. In the.
Peerless Plywood case, a representation case, the Board decided
' General Shoe, 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948); Sparklett Drinking Water Corp., 107'
N.L.R.B. 1462 (1954).
2 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
' 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
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that a pre-election speech which contained no coercive or promis-
ing language could constitute an interference with the election
of the type warranting the setting aside of an election where de-
livered within 24 hours prior to the election. The Board stated in
this case that, "Last minute speeches by either employer or unions
delivered to massed assemblies of employees on company time
have an unwholesome and unsettling effect and tend to interfere
with that sober and thoughtful choice which a free election is
designed to reflect." Also in this decision the Board stated that a
non-coercive speech made prior to the 24-hour period before an
election would not interfere with a free election.
With reference to interrogation of employees, the Board in
October, 1953, annonunced in its decision in the Walmac Com-
pany case,4 originating in San Antonio, Texas, that an employer
did not engage in interference (an unfair labor practice) by
polling each of its six employees as to whether or not they desired
union representation. Each employee was asked to choose one or
the other alternative on a slip of paper as to whether he desired
to represent himself or whether he desired to have the union
represent him. In this case the Board found no other acts of
coercion or threats or promises. The Board held that this act
of polling did not constitute an unfair labor practice, and in so
doing it reached a decision a.t variance with Board precedent, but
not at variance with the tenor of decisions of some Circuit Courts
of Appeals.5 Some other decisions issued from the fall of 1953
to July, 1954, carrying forward Chairman Farmer's statement to
the Labor Law Section of the American Bar Association that the
Board would be "going through a period of readjustment," are
the Blue Flash Express case,' and the National Furniture Manu-
facturing Company case.'
4 106 N.L.R.B. 1355 (1953).
5 NLRB v. Ozark Dam Construction Co., 190 F. 2d 222 (8th Cir. 1951) ; NLRB v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 192 F. 2d 160 (2nd Cir. 1951) ; NLRB v. Atlas Life Insurance
Co., 195 F. 2d 136 (10th Cir. 1952) ; NLRB v. Caroline Mills, Inc., 158 F. 2d 792 (5th
Cir. 1947) ; NLRB v. Hinds & Dauch Paper Co., 171 F. 2d 240 (4th Cir. 1948) ; NLRB v.
England Bros., Inc., 201 F. 2d 395 (1st Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Winer, Inc., 194 F. 2d
370 (7th Cir. 1952).
6 109 N.L.R.B. No. 85 (1954).
7 106 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1953).
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In the Blue Flash Express case, the employer, upon receiving
a request for recognition from a union, asked each of the em-
ployees whether they had signed the union authorization card.
Although each employee answered in the negative, the Board
found that there was no credible evidence of acts or statements
of threats or promise. The Board held that interrogation was not,
per se, an unfair labor practice. In reaching this decision, the
Board pointed out that it was following the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the Atlas Life Insurance Com-
pany case, a case originating in Tulsa, Oklahoma. In the Blue
Flash case the Board stated that, "We are not holding in this
decision that interrogation must be accompanied by unfair labor
practices before it can violate the Act. We are merely holding
that interrogation of employees by an employer as to such matters
as their union membership or union activities, which, when viewed
in the context in which the interrogation occurred, falls short of
interference or coercion, is not unlawful."
The per se doctrine as to interrogations was expressed in the
old Board case of Standard-Coosa-Thatcher,' but subsequent to
that decision the courts of six circuits condemned its rationale,
as previously mentioned. In the Blue Flash case the Board an-
nounced the test to be as follows: "The test is whether, under all
the circumstances, the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain
or interfere with the employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed by the Act." It stated the time, place, the personnel involved,
the information sought, the employer's conceded preference,
must be considered. The fact as to whether or not the employees
thought reprisals might be administered is not controlling-that
is, the fact that the employees gave false answers when questioned,
although relevant, is not controlling. The employees had no reason
to believe that economic reprisal might be visited upon them by
respondent.
Although this decision gave to employers more freedom in the
interrogation of employees as to their union activities, the Board
8 NLRB v. Atlas Life Insurance Co., 195 F. 2d 136 (10th Cir. 1952).
9 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949).
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issued a caution that employers should not consider it a license
to engage in interrogation.
The National Furniture Manufacturing Company case is a case
involving objections to an election predicated on the ground that
the employer's attorney made a statement eleven days before the
election, in the presence of a number of employees, that, "it
would not make any difference whether the union won the election
or not, the company would not recognize it." The attorney testified
that he stated only that the unit was not a recognized and valid
unit. Also in this case the employer mailed to its employees a
series of letters, one of which stated that the employer would be
forced to shut down his plant or move out of the city if he met
the demands published by the union. After noting that two other
companies in the area had moved out of town and another had
shut down, the letter urged the employees to vote against the union
and prevent a strike which the union was sure to get if they won
the NLRB election. The Board pointed out that the statements
were privileged under section 8(c), and further, that they did not
constitute an interference with the election; that the statement
of the attorney was merely the expression of a legal point of view.
These decisions rendered in October, 1953, and on July 30,
1954, represent the limit to which the door to interrogations has
been opened. A few cases that have followed these "door opening"
cases have tested the size of the opening in the door. Many unions
were frightened by the impact they thought the Blue Flash Express
decision would have, and many employers did not take seriously
the caution announced by the Board in that decision.
Most significant among these more recent cases are the Sears,
Roebuck & Co. case,"0 decided in August, 1954; Richards & Asso-
ciates," decided in September, 1954; Gilbert, Inc.,'" decided in
December, 1954; Graber Manufacturing Cd.,'3 decided in Jan-
uary, 1955; and Rein Co.,' 4 decided in February, 1955.
10 109 N.L.R.B. No. 102 (1954).
11110 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1954).
12 110 N.L.R.B. No. 231 (1954).
13 111 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1955).
14 111 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (1955).
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In the Sears, Roebuck & Company case the Board held inter-
rogation to be a violation of section 8 (a) (1). In this case there
was discrimination, and also statements of threats. One employee
was told that if he continued in his "actions," meaning his union
activities, he "more or less" would lose his job, and should think
of his family and his age before continuing. Another salesman
was told that the employer would find anything he could to ruin
his record and that he would be unable to get a position elsewhere.
Another employee was told that he could not arrange a vacation
for three weeks as he had done the prior year.
In the case of Richards & Associates, the Board held that the
employer violated the Act by making a pre-election speech which
contained an "implied" and "veiled" threat of reprisal against
employees who joined the union. In this case the employer polled
all employees as to their union sentiments by distributing ballots
among them; the ballots were of different color for the different
departments. The employees purportedly voted in secret. The
Board also found discriminatory discharge of five active union
adherents.
The trial examiner found, and the Board adopted these find-
ings, that "Respondent's speech was unlawfully coercive in that it
contained an implied threat that the Respondent will close his
business before he will deal with the union, and in that it con-
tained a veiled threat of reprisal against employees who join the
union."
The next case giving some insight as to the extent to which an
employer may legally interrogate is that of Gilbert, Inc. This deci-
sion is noteworthy in that it shows how tightly the Board is drawing
its caution announced in the Blue Flash Express case. In this
case the Board found no violations of the Act other than the
interferences constituting violation of section 8 (a) (1). There
were allegations of refusals to bargain and allegations of dis-
crimination, both of which the Board found to be without merit.
However, the Board did find the employer violated the Act by
r~peatedly questioning and polling the employees about their
union membership and activities; and stated that although the
employer may have acted in good faith the successive questioning
[Vol. 9
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and polling necessarily appeared coercive to employees. In the
same case, the Board found that the employer did not violate
section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by statements made in a speech an-
nouncing application to the Wage Stabilization Board for a wage
increase and announcing that under the union the employees would
be permitted to work only 40 hours a week instead of the existing
45 hours. The Board found that the announcement of a planned
wage increase was not designed to defeat union organization and
the discussion of a 40-hour week was no more than a "prediction."
This case was decided in December, 1954.
Another recent decision along the same vein is the Graber
Manufacturing Company case decided in January, 1955. In this
case the Board found only acts of interrogation and interference.
There were no other unfair labor practices. The Board found that
the employer engaged in interference by his interrogations, which
were not limited to ascertaining the union's majority status, but
which pertained generally to the employees' union activities and
union membership. The Board found that systematic questioning
of many employees by employer's top officials, accompanied by
other statements of interference, clearly tended to restrain em.
ployees in the exercise of their self-organizational rights. The other
statement of interference was in the nature of a supervisor's
remarks to an employee that he would be sorry if the union came
to the plant. In view of the extensive interrogation of employees
this statement was not purged by the employer's later general
statement to employees that employees would maintain their jobs
whatever happened. Another act of interference was the em-
ployer's request to employees that they remove their union but-
tons. The Board found that the employer did not engage in an
interference by granting a general wage increase two weeks before
the election, despite the fact that no such increase had ever before
been granted, because the increase was part of a new personnel
policy resulting from a study instituted prior to the organizational
campaign, and because the union did not protest the granting at
the time, and because the union did not object to the election or
file charges based on the raise.
Another case is the Rein Company case, decided in February,
1955]
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1955. In this case, which was a representation case and an objec-
tion to an election case, the Board found that the employer inter-
fered with the election by stating in a pre-election letter to em-
ployees that it had the legal right to discontinue existing benefits
after the election, that it would start negotiations from scratch if
the petitioning union won the election, and that it did not feel
bound to offer any pre-existing benefits in any contracts which the
union might thereafter negotiate. By such statements the employer
threatened to discontinue existing employee benefits, prior to bar-
gaining, if petitioner were certified as bargaining representative.
The Board set the election aside. As this was not an unfair labor
practice case, we cannot be certain as to whether or not the Board
would have found this conduct to have constituted an 8 (a) (1)
violation, although we get a hint of the Board's thinking along that
line from the Board's use of the word "threaten."
What conclusions can be drawn from the trend of the recent
decisions? The Board has made it clear that when it opened the
door to interrogation in its Walmac decision and in its Blue Flash
decision, the door was opened only wide enough to permit the
passage of non-coercive interrogation. It was not opened wide
enough to pass, and still blocks out, interrogation committed in
a setting of threats or promises, or containing implied or veiled
threats. Even in this conclusion we are still using words which
are elastic, but we have in artillery terms "bracketed" our target.
Let us look at three more "bracketing" decisions.
With reference to the 24-hour speech rule, where the employer
delivers a speech within the 24 hours, on company time and prop-
erty and where the speech is informal and non-partisan in char-
acter, this would not constitute grounds for setting aside the elec-
tion. This was the decision of the Board in the National Petro.
Chemicals Corporation case1" decided in March, 1954.
In the Texas City Chemical Company case,' 6 decided in July,
1954, the question arose as to whether or not a speech delivered
within the 24 hours was on company time. It was delivered in the
15 107 N.L.R.B. 1610 (1954).
10 109 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (1954).
[Vol. 9
RECENT DECISIONS
evening, and the employees on the evening shift were released
from their duty and were paid for their time while attending this
dinner given by the employer. The Board held that this speech
was on company time since the evening shift employees were paid
to attend the speech.
In the Underwood Corporation case,' decided in June, 1954,
the intervening union made a speech during the employees' lunch
hour from outside the company property over loud speakers
beamed to the employees. This was made within the 24 hours of
the election, but the Board held that it did not violate the Peerless
Plywood doctrine in that it was made on employee time and at-
tendance was voluntary.
By a decision in September, 1954, the Board announced a new
rule with reference to the use of sample ballots in campaigning
prior to an election. Prior thereto, either the employer or the union
had been permitted to distribute sample ballots with markings
as to how they wished the employees to mark their ballots at the
election. But in this decision of the Board in the Allied Electric
Products case,"8 the Board stated that "in the future it will not
permit the reproduction of any document purporting to be a copy
of the Board's official ballot, other than one completely unaltered
in form and content and clearly marked 'sample' on its face."
The Board's objection to the altering of ballots for distribution
in campaigning was based on the fact that they "tend to suggest
that the material appearing thereon bears this agency's approval."
This rule has been followed by the Board in several cases there-
after, and perhaps the most recent is that of the Memphis Furni-
ture Manufacturing Company case.' 9 In this case the union which
circulated the marked sample ballot attempted to prove that it did
in no way mislead the employees and that they clearly understood
it to be union propaganda. The Board decided that, nevertheless,
the rule announced in the Allied Electric Products case would be
followed and the election was set aside.
17 108 N.L.R.B. No. 199 (1954).
18 109 N.L.R.B. No. 177 (1954).
19 111 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (1955).
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Also, in the Wilmington Castings Company case,2" where both
the union and the company circulated separately altered ballots,
the Board set the election aside, holding that the wrongful conduct
of one party did not neutralize the other party's interference with
the employee's freedom of choice.
There has been one recent change in the Board's waiver policy;
that is, the policy pertaining to the waiving of certain interfer-
ences as grounds for objections to the results of an election. In
the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company case" the Board
issued the rule that all conduct which occurred prior to the issuance
of a notice of representation hearing or occurring prior to the
execution of a consent election agreement would be deemed waived
by either party as a basis for objecting to the results of the elec-
tion. In September, 1954, in the F. W. Woolworth Company case,22
the Board saw fit to amend this doctrine by changing the date, or
cut-off date, for the waiver from the date of issuance of notice of
hearing to the date of the issuance of the Board's Decision and
Direction of Election, or issuance of an amended Decision and
Direction of Election. This change was made because of the lapse
of time that occasionally occurs between Notice of Hearing and
the Board's Decision and Direction of Election. The Woolworth
Company case announced the rule that all matter occurring prior
to a Decision and Direction of Election would be deemed waived
by the parties. All conduct that might form the basis for an objec-
tion to the election that occurs after that date or after the execu-
tion of the consent election agreement could be used as the basis
for an objection to the election.
It is immaterial that the objecting party had no actual knowl-
edge of the acts of interference which preceded the cut-off date;
nevertheless, he is deemed to have waived any acts of interference
as basis for an objection to the election that occurred prior to
such cut-off date.23
20 110 N.L.R.B. No. 266 (1954).
21 101 N.L.R.B. 1118 (1952).
22 109 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1954).




A UNION'S CHOICE BETWEEN A REPRESENTATION PROCEEDING AND
A REFUSAL TO BARGAIN CHARGE
Another important development with reference to the employ-
ment of representation procedures is that announced by the Board
in December of 1954, in the Aiello Dairy Farm case.24 In this
case the union requested recognition of the employer and offered
to submit cards for inspection under certain conditions; that is,
that some impartial person be selected to check the cards against
the payroll, or on the condition that the employer agree in writing
to sign a contract in the event the cards showed a majority for the
union. The union had previously filed a representation petition,
and the employer, rather than check the cards, suggested that they
let the employees decide at a Labor Board election. A consent
election agreement was signed. The union filed objections to the
election following its loss of the election, and the election was
set aside based on unfair labor practices committed between the
execution of the consent election agreement and the date of the
election. After the election was set aside, the union withdrew its
petition and filed unfair labor practice charges, including a refusal
to bargain charge. The Board stated as follows:
Had the union earlier filed its charge of refusal to bargain, the Board
under its long-standing practice would not have conducted the repre-
sentation election until the charges were disposed of. Nor would the
Board have accepted a waiver of such a charge as sufficient reason for
permitting the election to proceed. A reason for this is that although
either a representation proceeding or an unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding alone might be, in the light of the particular circumstances,
the procedure appropriate for establishment of the union's status, both
cannot at once be appropriate because they are based on fundamentally
different premises. Thus, for the Board to proceed upon a representa-
tion petition requires the Board to find that a question of representa-
tion exists, to be resolved by an election. On the other hand, a charge
of unlawful refusal to bargain under section 8 (a) (5) of the Act
must allege in effect that there is no question of representation and that
24 110 N.L.R.B. No. 205 (1954).
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the union involved is in fact the exclusive representative, with whom
the employer is legally required to bargain. The basis of the two
proceedings are thus mutually inconsistent.
The Board in this decision overrules its holding in the M. H.
Davidson Company case.2" In the Davidson case the Board found
that the unfair labor practices which preceded the election made
the election a nullity, and further added the grounds that in fact
there was no real question of representation existing prior to or
at the time of the representation election, since the union did
represent a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit.
Thus, it is seen that the union must choose between proceeding
with a representation petition or proceeding with an unfair labor
practice charge. Does this mean that a union has the choice of pro-
ceeding with either a representation petition or with an 8 (a) (5)
charge upon being refused recognition? There are several cases
of the Board which indicate that an employer may insist upon a
representation election to prove the union's majority by a secret
ballot.
In the last few months of 1953, the Board handed down three
important decisions with reference to a union's use of authoriza-
tion cards to prove its majority. The first of these three was the
previously mentioned Walmac Company case, of San Antonio,
Texas, in which the Board found that an employer may normally
refuse to check the authorization cards; that is, he may refuse to
accept such evidence of proof of majority and insist upon an elec-
tion as the method of proving majority. There was no evidence
that the company had in any way misconducted itself or engaged
in any unfair labor practice other than certain interrogations which
the Board found to be isolated and therefore of not sufficient
severity to warrant a Board Order. The Board stated, "We deem
it unnecessary to decide whether the union in fact represented a
majority of the employees at any time during the event here re-
viewed." In the same vein are the Board's decisions in the Page
Boy Company case,26 and the Flint River Mills. 7 And following
25 94 N.L.R.B. 142 (1951).
26 107 N.L.R.B. 126 (1953).
27 107 N.L.R.B. 472 (1953).
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these decisions is the more recent Blue Flash Express case de-
cided in July, 1954, in which it was found that the employer did
not violate the Act by refusing to bargain with the union which
did represent a majority of the employees in an appropriate bar-
gaining unit. The evidence did not establish that, in refusing to
extend recognition to the union, the employer was motivated by
any consideration other than its asserted good faith doubt of the
union's majority status.
These cases indicate that an employer may at any time insist
upon a Board ordered election, but there is one very important
limitation of this right, which has been pointed out by one very
recent decision of the Board in the Pyne Molding Corporation
case,"s decided in December, 1954. In this case it was pointed out
that if an employer entertains a bad faith doubt of majority,
which bad faith is manifested by his engaging in unfair labor
practices in an effort to defeat that majority, then his refusal to
bargain with the union or to recognize the union constitutes a vio-
lation of section 8 (a) (5), although there has been no represen-
tation election. Thus, it may be concluded that an employer may
not insist upon a Board ordered election where he does so for the
purpose of utilizing that additional time to defeat the union's
majority or to interfere with the rights of the employees to be so
represented. The distinction between a good faith doubt of a
union's majority and a bad faith doubt is also pointed up by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Trimfit of California Com-
pany case, 9 decided in February, 1954.
Here we find the same caution warning to employers following
the opening of a new door to them, that door being the right to
insist upon a Board ordered election, and the caution being that
they may not use this procedure as a means of gaining time to
commit unfair labor practices. Their insistence upon a Board
ordered election must be in good faith as opposed to bad faith.
Thus again the Board is not giving an employer a license or a
"blank check" to elections. The door is only open to those who
28 110 N.L.R.B. No. 240 (1954).
29 211 F. 2d 206 (9th Cir. 1954).
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manifest good faith, or rather a more proper way of expressing it
is that the door is open to all except those who manifest bad
faith.
III
REPRESENTATION PETITIONS FILED WITHIN THE
CERTIFICATION YEAR
Another major change in the law has to do with representation
petitions filed within the certification year. The case announcing
this change is the Ludlow Typograph Company case.8" This case
permits the filing of the representation petition within the certifica-
tion year in certain instances, and thereby overrules the Board's
prior doctrine that all petitions filed within the 12-month period
following certification would be dismissed. The Board, with
Murdock and Peterson dissenting, decided that a petition filed
timely with reference to the contract expiration date would not
be dismissed although filed within the certification year. It was
the reasoning of the Board in this case that this rule would pro-
tect the interest of the employees far more than the rule in the
Quaker Maid case, which "unduly prolongs the protection afforded
an employer and an incumbent union by the certification, with con-
sequent damage to the employees' freedom of choice."
IV
NEW CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE DURING STRIKES
Another important recent contribution to labor law has to do
with strike violence situations. In December, 1954, the Board
decided two cases on this point in the B.V.D. Company case,1
2
and the Longview Furniture Company case.88
The Board has continuously recognized a certain amount of
s0 108 N.L.R.B. No. 209 (1954).
81 Centr-O-Cast, 100 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1952); Quaker Maid Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 915
(1946).
82 110 N.L.R.B. No. 206 (1954).
s 110 N.L.R.B. No. 246 (1954).
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animal exuberance in strikers, and has made allowance for, or
condoned, certain acts performed as results thereof. Also, it is a
Board rule that an employee who engages in acts of violence on
the picket line shall not be entitled to the benefits of a remedial
order, that is back pay and reinstatement. Of course, these two
opposing points of law must meet and clash in certain places and
on certain occasions. Name calling has generally been condoned
as animal exuberance; also minor misconduct such as that of
tripping and shoving a non-striker at the picket line has also been
condoned as animal exuberance.84 And, of course, occasionally
there are acts of violence in connection with a strike which cannot
be attributed to any of the striking employees. It is against such
acts of violence and in such situations that two recent decisions
have dealt. In the B.V.D. Company case there were some rather
serious and aggravated acts of violence including dynamiting,
cutting of telephone wires, firing of bullets through windows,
and threats of physical violence to non-strikers. Nails were
thrown on company roadways; the car of respondent's vice-presi-
dent was forced into a ditch; and eggs were thrown on non-striking
employees. Of all the violence, only two employees could be
identified as engaging in any of the acts, and that was in the egg-
throwing incident. The trial examiner considered the egg-throw-
ing by these two employees, when considered in the context of the
entire course of violence, to have been trivial, and he ordered
reinstatement for all employees on the grounds that this instance
was trivial and the other instances of violence could not be attri-
buted to any of the striking employees. Also, the trial examiner
said the evidence failed to disclose a conspiracy on the part of the
striking employees to commit violence. The violence was appar-
ently committed by strike sympathizers. The Board found that
the striking employees by taking no steps to disavow or repudiate
this misconduct are thereby deemed to have approved and ratified
the violence. The Board stated as follows:
Whether or not the strikers expressly authorized such conduct, it re-
mains true that they invited and accepted the benefits of it and took
no steps to discourage or repudiate it. The fair inference is that at least




those strikers who continued to picket during the violent strike wel-
comed, approved and ratified such conduct. We do not believe that
in these circumstances it would effectuate the policies of the Act to
order reinstatement and back pay to such strikers.... We do not hold,
as stated in the dissent, that strikers who are themselves blameless are
responsible for the lawlessness of strangers. But we do say that strikers
have no right to protection when they, at the very least, welcomed the
aid of criminal elements who took over their strike and desecrated it
with violence and terrorism. We are forced to conclude that those
strikers who continued to picket not only approved and ratified the
violence, but actually invited it.... We do not suggest, as the dissent
states, that the strikers could have purged themselves only by aban-
doning their picketing. There were other avenues open to them by
which they could have disavowed the misconduct.
The Board did order reinstatement, however, to certain strikers
whose support of the strike was only passive, that is, they re-
mained away from work and did not picket or otherwise lend
affirmative aid to the strike. The Board did not regard such dis-
criminatees as having approved or ratified the strike violence.
The Longview Furniture Company case involved acts of name-
calling as distinguished from acts of overt violence. In 1952 the
Board found that the employer had violated section 8 (a) (1)
and (3) of the Act, and had ordered him to reinstate with back
pay certain strikers. Enforcement was sought from the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Court, the employer contested the
validity of the order only insofar as it required reinstatement and
back pay of certain strikers who had engaged in name-calling
and certain other strikers who were present when another striker
assaulted a non-striking employee. The Court held that the four
strikers who were present when the assault upon the non-striking
employee had occurred had cooperated with that person who com-
mitted the assault and thereby forfeited any right they had to
reinstatement. The Court remanded the case to the Board to
determine which of the employees had banded together in hurling
profane, obscene and insulting epithets at non-striking employees
and therefore should be denied reinstatement. The Board recog-
nized that in the remand the Court was announcing a new prin-
ciple, which was that strikers who have banded together or com-
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bined with others in hurling a barrage of profane, obscene and
insulting epithets at non-strikers in an effort to prevent them
from working are not entitled to reinstatement. The Board ac-
cepted the remand and did not seek certiorari, but it stated that,
"Having accepted the remand, we shall of course, apply the prin-
ciple laid down by the Court in its decision as a rule of law for
this case only." The Board in applying the test found that six
employees had acted in concert in hurling a continuous and repeti-
tious barrage of profane and insulting jibes at the non-strikers
and thereby combined or banded together in an effort publicly
to so degrade and humiliate the non-strikers as to prevent them
from going to work. The Board also found that the three other
employees engaged in only isolated instances of name-calling
and did not join in the repetitive insults of the other six strikers.
The Board stated, "These isolated incidents, falling in the area
of individual 'animal exuberance,' afford insufficient basis for
denial of reinstatement to the three employees."
1955]
